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ABSTRACT
The study undertakes a review of essential aspects of the principle of peoplecenteredness which is enshrined in the treaty for the establishment of the East African
Community II (1999) as a key operational principle. The first EAC collapsed in 1977 and
many analysts blamed the lack of popular support (among other things) for this failure.
The study seeks to determine the extent to which the partner states are employing people
centeredness to realize the Community’s ultimate of objective of attaining a political
federation.
Based on Article 7 of the treaty, the idea of people-centeredness seems to have
included both a focus on people-centric development programs as well as a concern about
popular involvement in the institutions of the EAC II. This thesis, however, discusses
only the popular involvement in the institutions of the EAC II. I therefore assess whether
the institutions of the community have granted access to civil society – specifically,
business, labor and women’s groups – in accordance with Article 7. I also review the
ways in which the community has tried to involve the people as a whole, in the form of
polling, and other means of outreach. The hypothesis guiding this study is that without
inculcating a focus on the people, regional integration is unlikely to lead to the highest
stage of political federation.
My findings are: people-centeredness is not the only condition but is a necessary one.
When properly utilized, it has the potential to not only ensure continued popular support
to the regional integration project, but also to contribute to the conditions necessary for
the integration arrangement to remain sustainable. On the other hand, the absence of a
people-centered element is likely to make the integration moribund in the longer term.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
This study examines the role of “people-centeredness” in facilitating the success
of integration in the East African Community (hereinafter referred to as the
“Community” or alternatively by its acronym - EAC II). Because people-centeredness is
enshrined in the treaty for the establishment of the EAC II (1999) as a key operational
principle,1 the study undertakes a review of the essential aspects of the principle to
determine the extent to which it is being employed to realize the Community’s ultimate
of objective of attaining a political federation.2
Based on Article 7 of the treaty, the idea of people-centeredness seems to have
included both a focus on people-centric development programs as well as a concern about
popular involvement in the institutions of the EAC II. In this thesis, however, I will
discuss only the second factor. I will thus assess whether the institutions of the
community have granted access to civil society – specifically, business, labor and
women’s groups – in accordance with Article 7. I will also review the ways in which the
community has tried to involve the people at large in the form of polling and other forms
of outreach.
Examining the impact of people-centeredness on the EAC II integration is
important as the creation of a political federation is going to affect the lives of more than
130 million East Africans, currently residing within the borders of the five partner states.

1 East African Community Secretariat, Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community.
Arusha, Tanzania (2002): East African Secretariat, p.1.
2 Ibid. p.3.
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The feat will also result in far-reaching economic, socio-cultural and political
transformations in the entire EAC II region.
At the same time, while examining the question of people-centeredness within the
EAC II’s specific framework, it is worth mentioning that the Community’s regional
integration endeavors are not happening in isolation. They are part of the global and
continental frameworks, which have remained constant features of inter-state cooperation
over time since the 19thcentury. Between 1850 and 1890, for instance, Europe adopted a
loose form of regional cooperation, with industrialization as its driving force. Despite
those early efforts at regionalism, however, elaborate regionalization only became a norm
after the end of World War II. This was as a result of an increased level of regional and
global interactions, in particular in the areas of economics, security and political
cooperation within Europe.3
In the case of Africa, the experience of regional cooperation dates as far back as
the late 1900s. Emanating f rom the ideals of Pan-Africanism, whose ultimate objective
was centered on how to attain Pan-African unity, contemporary African integration can
be best traced from the 1960s, following the wide-reaching attainment of independence
by the majority of African states from European colonialism. At the time, the most
central question was what would be the best means by which to attain African
integration.4 To that end, although a lengthy debate occurred among the African leaders
of the time, which led to an initial formation of four informal groups on how to proceed

4 Jaime De Melo and Alvin Panagaria, New Dimensions in Regional Integration. New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999.
5. David J. Francis, Uniting Africa: Building Peace and Security Systems. Aldershot, Hampshire, UK:
Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006, pp.19 -28.
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with the continental integration project, a collective position on the future of African
integration was eventually adopted on May 25, 1963, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, when the
Organization of African Unity (OAU) was born.5
The Addis Ababa Summit of Heads of State and Governments eventually
endorsed one of the positions on African regional integration, which had been held by a
group of African leaders, otherwise nicknamed “gradualists” for their advocacy of
regional economic integration first before considering the attainment of African political
unity. The gradualist approach was adopted as a compromise position from the various
viewpoints, one of which, pioneered by Kwame Nkurumah, advocated achieving
immediate continental unity in the sense of a United States of Africa.
Tanzania’s Julius Kambarage Nyerere and Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser became
the most vocal advocates of the gradualist approach. They both shared the view that
“regionalism [was] an intermediate stage (not and end) to African unity.”6 While Nasser
believed that African unity “could not be achieved overnight,” 7 Nyerere strongly
advocated a “step-by-step approach” as the “driving force for African unity in practical
terms.”8 With the adoption of the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, therefore,
gradual integration of the African countries and peoples was assured.9 The OAU,
headquartered in Addis Ababa, survived until it was transformed into the African Union
(AU) in 2001, which continues to date.

5

T.O. Elias, “The Charter of the Organization of African Unit,” The American Journal of International
Law, Vol.59, No.2, April 1965, p.243.
6
David J. Francis, op.cit., p. 19.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
T.O. Elias, The Charter of the Organization of African Unity. The American Journal of International
Law, Vol59, No.2 (Apr, 1965), pp.243-267.
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Africa’s gradualist integration project continues through a number of regional
economic communities (RECs). In fact, according to the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA), Africa is currently home to 14 RECs, each at a
different stage of development. In addition, most of Africa’s RECs are overlapping in
membership across or within their regions, a phenomenon referred to as “multiple
membership.”10 The East African Community (EAC II) is one among those RECs and
forms the subject matter for this study. The EAC II is a successor to an initial REC of the
same name (EAC I), formed in 1967 by Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, but disbanded in
1977. EAC II was formed in 1999.
From its establishment through to its collapse, the EAC I was widely seen as too
heavily leader-centered and nationalistic.11 As a result, when the EAC II was
reestablished, “people-centeredness” was made a major focus.12
This thesis explores whether the old tendency to be leader-centric and to cling to
sovereignty is still evident within the EAC II states or if there is visibly more progress
towards people-centeredness, which is considered to be a pre-requisite for success in the
realization of a political federation.13 The study also attempts to examine whether
institutional mechanisms have been put in place to enable the incorporation of the views
of the people of East African in the community’s decision-making processes, and if they
are functioning as envisaged. To contextualize the thesis’s objective, the next chapter
outlines the study’s research design, including the underlying theoretical framework.
10

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II:
Rationalizing Regional Economic Communities. Addis Ababa: UNECA & African Union, p.52.
11
Ali S. Mchumo, “An Overview of the EAC,”Seminar for Members of the Tanzania National Assembly.
Mimeo: Dodoma, Tanzania: February 2003.
12
EAC Secretariat, The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 1999. Arusha:
Tanzania: EAC Secretariat, 2000.
13
Ibid.
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CHAPTER TWO
Research Design
This study is guided by the following hypothesis: Without inculcating a focus on
the people, regional integration is unlikely to lead to the highest stage of political
federation. I operationalize this people-orientation or people-centeredness at both
institutional and policy levels. I intend to explore how the concept has been implemented
in the EAC II up to the time of study.
The Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC 1999, coined the term “peoplecenteredness” in order to uphold the ideals of popular involvement of the peoples of East
Africa as well as the essence of incorporating market forces in regional integration.14
Because the EAC I was not considered people-centered, employment of the concept was
seen as a necessary facet to enable the EAC II’s navigation of its successive integration
stages through to the eventual goal of realizing an East African political federation. 15
In the treaty, the following was noted in Article 7 as the key objectives for the
establishment of the community, which appear to be directly linked to peoplecenteredness:
a. Improving the standard of living and quality of life of the people of East
Africa;
b. Ensuring balanced, orderly, consistent and fair development in East Africa;
c. Promoting the active participation and benefit of the people in development;
d. Enabling the business community and the general public to play a leading
role; and
14

Rwekaza Sympho Mukandala and Nestor N Luanda, “Tanzania’s Regional Bilateral and Multilateral
Cooperation,” Mimeo. Dar es Salaam, University of Dar es Salaam, July 2002, p.7.
15
EAC Secretariat (2000), op cit.

12

e. Strengthening and improving the role of women in development.
People centeredness is therefore defined based on two facets: The first facet
relates to people-centeredness in terms of programs established to benefit the people
across the partner states. In this thesis I deal only with whether the EAC II has paid
attention to the needs of businesses and women groups in the integration process. I also
look at the interests of the people at large by reviewing the work of some committees
established in 2001 to determine whether East Africans were in favor of integration and
federation.
The second facet related to the definition of people centeredness is institutional.
Article 9 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 1999
especially details the principal structures (or organs) through which the organization
functions, namely, the Summit, Council of Ministers, Coordinating Committees, Sectoral
Committees, the East African Court of Justice, the East African Legislative Assembly
(EALA), the Secretariat, and “such other organs as may be established by the Summit.”16
People centeredness will therefore be manifested if institutional mechanisms are in
existence to ensure that inputs from non-governmental actors have space for inclusion in
the work of the EAC II organs.
I define regional integration as a process. Ernest Haas stands as one of the leading
proponents of this definition. Haas defines integration as “a process whereby political
actors in several distinct settings shift their loyalties and political activities towards a new
center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing nation-

16

EAC Secretariat, Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC 1999, Article 9 (1) (h)., EAC Secretariat,
Arusha, 2000, p. 20.
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states.”17 In reality, however, especially in Africa, experience shows that it takes an
extremely long time for states to navigate through the economic maze of cooperation
and/or integration, let alone to realize such a political shift. To date, the EAC II continues
to struggle to implement a customs union, which should have reached a zero-tariff rate as
early as 2009. Furthermore, it was supposed to have attained a common market by 2012;
again, this is a feat is yet to occur.
Another “process” scholar, Hiroshi Kitamura, defines regional integration as a
process in which attempts are made to create a desirable institutional framework for
optimization of general economic policy. This definition is generally applicable but fails
to address the question of who integrates and how they go about the integration process.
In this study, therefore, regional integration refers to the process by which states
in a particular geographical location mutually and voluntarily decide to cooperate, usually
agreeing to create regional institutions and rules aimed at enhancing cooperation. As a
result of their cooperation arrangement, member states that reach such an agreement do
need also to agree to cede some of their sovereign powers to the supra-national institution
they create. The aim is to enable the planning and execution of their cooperation as
mutually agreed in the relevant legal instruments detailing their cooperation.
Furthermore, as the process of integration evolves, the objectives of the regional
arrangement may range from economic to political cooperation. According to past
experience, the most common trend appears to be that regional integration will follow a
politico-economic evolutionary path, where commercial endeavors usually become the

17

Ernest B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 1958, p.16.
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means through which broader socio-political, even security, cooperation objectives are
achieved. However, this path is by no means assured.
I choose to study only the three founder countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda
instead of the total membership of five (Burundi and Rwanda inclusive) because of two
main reasons. The first reason is the history of the three countries in creating the now
moribund EAC I (1967-1977). After the collapse of the EAC I in 1977 the partner states
agreed to divide their common assets, which they did in 1984. However, almost
immediately after signing the assets dissolution agreement, the countries resumed their
integration efforts anew in 1986.
The second reason for choosing to limit this study to the three founder countries
of the EAC II is both the short duration in which Burundi and Rwanda have been
members of the organization (since 2007) and their (still) lack of influence in the
community compared to the three founder states. The latter point is centered on their
geographical locations within the EAC II as well as their population and economic sizes.
Geographically, both countries are land locked, with a combined land size of 54,168 sq
km (Burundi’s is 27,830 sq km and Rwanda’s is 26,338 sq km). Such a land size is rather
small compared to Tanzania’s 947,300 sq km, Kenya’s 580,367 sq km and Uganda’s
241,038 sq km.
In terms of the size of their economies, which is a factor affecting their
contributions to the EAC II Common Market, Burundi’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP),
per purchasing power parity, is estimated only at $5.58billion (2012 estimates), while her
current population size is 11 million (July 2013). Rwanda’s GDP is much larger, standing
at $17.74 billion (2012 estimates), while she has a population size of 12.1 million (July
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2013 estimates). However, Rwanda is experiencing an extremely rapid population growth
rate of 3.0 percent per annum, while at the same time evidencing one of the highest
population densities in the world (415.5 people per sq km).18 With the majority of their
populations being rural and subsistence agro-based (more than 80 percent), Burundi and
Rwanda are unlikely to affect the EAC II integration in any significant way for the
foreseeable future.
On the other hand, the three EAC II founder states’ statistics and potentials are
highly interesting. While both Kenya and Tanzania are littoral states on the Indian Ocean,
Uganda, though landlocked, has a large inland water body (Lake Victoria), which the
other two countries also share. The country is also confirmed to have large deposits of oil
reserves, with its GDP (PPP) currently at $51.27billion (2012 estimates) and its
population size being 34.8 million.19 In addition, Kenya’s GDP (PPP) stands at
$77.1billion with its current population size 44million (July 2013 estimates) and
Tanzania’s GDP (PPP) currently stands at $28.24billion, with the country also possessing
proven reserves of mineral, gas and natural gas deposits. The size of Tanzania’s
population (2012 estimates) stands at 49.5million.20
The movement towards re-establishing the EAC II accelerated from 1986 to 1999.
But by the time the leaders were signing the treaty to re-establish the EAC II in 2000,
complaints were already being raised by intellectuals about the lack of participation of

18

CIA Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rw (July 2013) and
http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx?crName=RWANDA.
19
World Bank Report. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/tanzania and CIA Factbook:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html and
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ug.html.
20
Ibid.
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the population in the process of integration.21 That is why the extent of peoplecenteredness in EAC II integration has been chosen as the topic for this study. With the
predecessor organization (EAC I) having manifested a clear tendency to be more of a
“leaders’ community” or club, which contributed to its failure,22 the founding fathers of
the EAC II saw the need to enshrine people-centeredness in Article 7 of the Treaty.23
To ascertain whether people-centeredness appears to be facilitative of the EAC
II’s integration progress, I use qualitative research and some quantitative data from across
the three EAC II states.
Theoretical Framework
My examination of the EAC II integration processes is located within broader
regional integration theory, which is divided into two major approaches. The first
classification involves economic integration theories and the second emanates from
political science and international relations (IR) theories.
Economic integration theory is premised on the idea that states integrate gradually
by way of successive economic stages, starting from loose cooperation to more
consolidated and centralized stages involving the creation of custom unions and common
markets within the regions concerned. The successive growth stages may then compel the
integrating states to attain the highest level of interstate cooperation in the economic
sense, which is attaining monetary union, thus enabling the establishment of a unified
economic policy-making arena. Economic integration theory starts by dealing with such

21

Andrew Kiondo, “The people’s involvement in the estabishment of the EAC”, in Sengndo Mvungi (ed),
The Draft Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community: A Critical Review, Dar es Salaam:
Dar es Salaam University Press, 2002.
22
Ibid.
23
EAC Secretariat, The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community 1999, Arusha:
Tanzania: EAC Secretariat, 2000, p.14.
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issues as regional market relationships and trade flows. On the other hand, IR-oriented
integration theory is grounded in federalist, functionalist/neo-functionalist and liberal
intergovernmental approaches.

Economic Approaches to Regional Integration
Economic approaches to regional integration are among the most prevalent in the
field. In that regard, the effort to build those theories has been quite strong. 24 Walter
Mattli has for instance distinguished two economic approaches, namely, custom union
theory and economic integration theory.25
Customs union theory
Customs union (CU) theory is mainly concerned with the elimination of interstate trade barriers and the establishment of common import tariff agreements. The
central principle is that the removal of tariffs would allow states within the regional
arrangement to benefit from cheaper imports stemming from more efficient industries
located in another member state. Consequently, “the degree of trade diversion is likely to
be small, where the members of a union have extensive trade with each other and a low
common tariff on imports from non-member countries.”26
The greatest value of CU theory is the emphasis on the relationship between trade
and factors of production, where non-members attract penalties through higher tariff rates
to protect the CU members’ trade. As a result, there is the likelihood of accruing benefits
to member states, including economies of scale and intra-regional trade efficiencies.

24

Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond, London: Cambridge University
Press, 1990,p p. 25-6.
25
Ibid, p.27.
26
ibid, p. 32.
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Among the most prevalent weaknesses of CU theory is that it does not address the
question of trade diversion from less efficient CU members to more efficient economies
outside the region. A third state outside the CU might have lower production costs
compared to the CU members, the result of which would be trade diversion. As a
consequence, to ensure that trade from outside the CU does not distort trade within, the
ideal would be for the countries to join a global customs union, thereby avoiding trade
diversion as much as possible. Yet the latter scenario is impractical, and so CU theory
does not provide a wholly satisfactory theoretical basis for the phenomenon of regional
integration.
Economic Integration Theory
Economic integration theory, also known as the “step-by-step” economic theory,
purports that regional arrangements, while commencing with free trade agreements,
would move to establish a custom union (CU), at which stage elimination of intraregional trade barriers would be effected. In turn, this would lead to the establishment of
a common external tariff against third states. Consequently, a CU is expected to evolve
into a common market (CM), eventually leading to the ultimate realization of a political
union (PU).27
Bela Balassa identifies six different steps through which economic integration
would usually occur: preferential trading areas, free trade areas, customs union, common
market, economic and monetary union and eventually complete economic integration.28
Andrew Moravcsik argues, especially in comparative reference to European
integration, that at the commencement of integration, since national preferences take

27
28

Ibid.
Bela, Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration. Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, 1961.
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center stage, economic interests are the most important catalysts for the process. 29 This is
also a position taken by Finn Laursen30 who argues that success in the next stages of the
integration process following the establishment of supranational institutions will depend
on the combined support (and demand) of the economic as well as the political actors
across the integrating states,31 relative to the respective benefits they deem accruable
from integration.
Although the economic approaches to regional integration are good at explaining
the economic integration stages and the economic and political actors involved, they do
not deal fully with the role of non- economic factors. In that sense, examination of the IRbased integration theories is also necessary.
International Relations Theory
The Federalist Approach
The focus of federalist theories is the creation of new states, usually through the
amalgamation of previously existing ones; on a regional basis, the eventual goal is the
creation of a single state.32 Located within the political sphere of regional integration
theories, federalism de-emphasizes the pull of economic factors as drivers for integration
and focuses more on the background and historical connectivity of the people who
integrate. As Chris Brown argued, “one’s view of federalism depends on their [sic]
historical experiences and culture.”33

29

Andrew Moravcsik, (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.31, No. 4.
30
Finn Laursen, (2003). Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives. Aldershot,
Hampshire, England & Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate.
31
Ibid.
32
Chris Brown, Understanding International Relations. (2001). London: Palgrave.
33
Ibid.
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Consequently, the presumption behind federalism is that decisions to federate are
made by political elites in and across the federating units. Political elites within
federating states would have to “surrender” their national sovereignty in favor of a
regional or world government. The states would then be reduced either to limited internal
autonomy or they would experience total loss of the right to national sovereignty.
The Functionalist/Neo-Functionalist Approach
Functionalist/neo-functionalist theories, also originating from political science,
generally focus on the assumption that regional integration is not intended to replace the
nation-state. In functionalism (also referred to as a gradualist34 or step-by-step35
approach), the state remains supreme over the institutions that emerge out of the
integration process. At the same time, neo-functionalist scholars, sharing a belief in the
gradualist approach argued by their functionalist predecessors, further argue that,
ultimately, inter-state cooperation will “spillover” into the “less controversial” economic,
social, and technical areas.36
The assumption is that decision-making relating to politics and sovereignty is way
too “controversial” for states to be expected to cede easily to any sort of federal or supranational entity. However, approaching integration from the economic angle makes sense
in terms of building political trust and the bridges necessary to eventually become
politically more region-oriented.
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With regard to the EAC I, its establishment was done along functionalist lines.
The partner states, having realized that an EAC federal state was unattainable as had been
desired earlier by some of the leaders at the time, decided to adopt an integration
arrangement, which would enable them to cooperate technically and economically. For
example, region-wide cooperation was launched in the areas of provision of rail and
airline common services. When it came to the more difficult issue of deepening
integration towards political federation however, it was impossible to proceed. Even
today, each country remains mired in its own national circumstances.
Furthermore, in regards to neo-functionalism, the goal is for the integrating states
to create supranational institutions. Aiming to ensure efficient functioning of inter-state
cooperation, neo-functionalism further assumes that the institutions created will result in
changes to the sovereignties of the participating states. Walter Mattli argued that the
supra-national institutions, once in place, may have to be granted regulatory powers
which go beyond those of the nation-states, in particular concerning the matters on which
integration has occurred.37
In addition, neo-functionalists argue that supra-national institutions created by
integrating states are no longer the only actors in integration. Rather, a whole range of
non-state actors equally interested in the integration arrangements exists, in particular
civil society and private sector organizations. The relevance of non-state actors is such
that, at times, they have influence and networking capacities transcending national and
regional boundaries thereby, at times, exuding abilities to project agendas beyond the
local or national realms of governments. By leveraging their cross–regional networks
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with the supranational institutions, non - state actors may also access platforms in order
to coordinate issues regionally by addressing them at the supra national level. For that
reason, Mattli argued that “supra-nationality is now seen as the only method available to
states to secure maximum welfare.”38
For the EAC II, by virtue of its treaty’s provisions, especially given the founders’
intent as expressed in the Preamble, neo-functionalist thinking seems to have informed
the commencement of the process, namely, proceeding incrementally from the economic
arena and building institutions to support the process until, eventually, a political
federation is realized.39
The federation was viewed as the ultimate end of the integration spectrum,
although it is not clear what kind of federation was desired. Still, there are clear
indications of federalist thinking being incorporated as part of the concept of EAC II
integration. Moreover, when the EAC II is analyzed in terms of institutional creation, it
manifests ideals borrowed from neo-functionalist thinking. The institutions include
although are not limited to, the EAC Secretariat, the East African Legislative Council
(EALC), the Council of Ministers, and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ).
The EAC II institutions also signify the emergence of some level of supranationality. But, unfortunately, the concept of supra-nationality falls short of explaining
what usually happens in regional integration, especially when the member states still
retain their respective sovereign powers to cherry-pick what they can or cannot
implement at their national levels of preferences, from the regional milieu of integration
policies and choices. In that case, a theory capable of helping to understand such a central
38
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role of state sovereignty in the context of regional arrangements is liberal
intergovernmentalism.
The Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory
Liberal intergovernmentalism emerged in the 1990s as a way to explain the
failures of the European Communities (EC) in the mid-1960s to 1970s. At the time,
French President Charles de Gaulle had instructed his ministers to not take part in EC
Council meetings. The prohibition occurred because de Gaulle opposed the EC Council’s
mode of decision-making by use of the qualified majority vote (QMV). France’s
argument was that adopting the QMV went against the EC members’ individual rights to
defend their national interests. In that case, it was argued, a decision reached through the
QMV did not deserve implementation if it would undermine an opposing member states’
national interest.40
De Gaulle’s position led to the EC’s negotiation and adoption of the Luxembourg
compromise in January 1966. By virtue of the compromise, the EC’s six members
“agreed to disagree,”41 thereby overhauling their former consensual mode of decisionmaking in order to accommodate the use of the QMV, but only on major policy issues
facing the EC as a whole. Thus a rule was passed wherein the member states would get
the consent of their people before the adoption of a far-reaching longer term decision. In
addition, the role and diversity of national interests amongst the integrating states were
reaffirmed, which could lead to diversity in outcomes at the regional institutional level.
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Thus liberal intergovernmentalism, as a theory, emerged in order to express the
aggregation of national interests brought to the integration table by each member state.
Advanced by Andrew Moravcsik,42 the theory operates on a three-stage continuum.
The first stage relates to how each member state brings onto the negotiating table
its national preferences – deemed necessarily achievable through the regional integration
arrangement. The important question here is what informs a state’s national preferences.
Are they driven, for example, by economic gain or geopolitical influence? Moravcsik’s
answer was that most national preferences, which catapult states into regional integration,
are more economic than geopolitical.43 By implication, if those preferences are not met,
which means that a state’s national interest will not be accommodated, then there is
likelihood that the said member state’s commitment to integration could be in doubt.
The second stage concerns interstate negotiations, which member states undertake
during the integration process. Each member state seeks to ensure maximum
incorporation of its respective national preferences. Referred to as “grand bargaining,” 44
interstate negotiations would be deemed successful by a member state if the principal
domestic actors see the outcome as such. In addition, member states’ adherence to
regional regulations are likely to depend on the degree to which each member perceived
that their national preferences were incorporated at the regional level to their principal
national actors’ benefit and satisfaction.
While the outcomes of “grand bargaining” remain crucial to forecasting the
importance principal actors and groups in respective national settings place on a regional
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institution, Moravcsik cautions that any efforts by the member states to negotiate
“package deals” in order to achieve concessions that would enable them to reach set
regional goals will likely create “domestic losers.”45 As a result, states are likely to “limit
the use of package deals”46 when negotiating initiatives aimed to achieve integration
goals. Consequently, whichever principal national actors influence the process of
integration for a particular member state, they are bound to impact the attainment of
regional integration goals from the standpoint of the state concerned.
The third and final stage, known as “institutional choice,” seeks to explain the
rationale by which, after “grand bargaining”; member states decide either to “pool” their
sovereignty or to “delegate” their decision-making powers to the international institutions
they create.47 In the case of the EAC II, pooling of sovereignty occurs via the centralized
model of decision-making wherein, through the Council of Ministers, the EAC II makes
policy recommendations for final approval by the Summit of the Heads of State. But
there is a catch: As Dani Wadada Nabudere argues, such mode of decision-making
cannot happen without a “political binding force, short of a political union.”48
The delegation of decision-making powers to international institutions refers to
the extent member states are ready to allow a regional institution to determine crucial
elements of the integration process without interference from those member states. In the
case of the EAC II, the test of whether delegation exists is best applied by determining
how strongly each member state abides by decisions reached at the regional level,
45
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including by the community’s technical organs. In particular, this refers to the roles and
perceptions, at the national level, of decisions reached in the context of the Secretariat,
East African Court of Justice (EACJ) or the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA).
Are those regional institutions capable of reaching binding decisions to which the partner
states have shown unreserved compliance and seem to be ready to accept penalties in the
event of proven non-compliance? This question may require further research outside the
ambit of this study, but it serves to show the importance of member states’ commitment
to building strong regional institutions in the context of liberal intergovernmentalism.
For this study, it is important to find out whether people centeredness remains
central to the EAC II’s integration as emphasized in the treaty and what means of popular
participation are being employed to implement it. Furthermore, understanding who plays
the predominant roles in determining integration is likely to shed light on whether the
EAC II will truly attain its ultimate objective, that of a political federation, which is
expected to be attained more quickly when the community is people centered.
Furthermore, by incorporating the role of domestic actors, liberal intergovernmentalism
theory is likely to provide a useful guide for the analysis of people centeredness. A
summary of the model is provided in Table 2.1 below.49
Table 2.1: Liberal Intergovernmentalism Theory: Stages for Regional
Integration
Stages
Stage 1:
Stage 2:
Stage3:
National
Interstate
Institutional
Preferences
Bargaining
Choice/Type and
Formation
Role vis-à-vis
Sovereignty of
Member States
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Alternative
independent variables
underlying each stage

What is the source
of underlying
national
preferences?
Economic interests
or
Geopolitical
interests?
Asymmetrical
interdependence or
supranational
entrepreneurship?

Given national Given substantive
preferences
agreement, what
what explains
Explains the transfer
the efficiency
of sovereignty to
and
international
distributional
Institutions?
outcomes of
interstate
bargaining?
Federalist ideology or centralized
technocratic management or more
credible commitment?

Agreements on Choice to delegate
substance
(to the supranational
(What national institution) or pool
Observed outcomes at Underlying national preferences
decision-making in
each stage
preferences
seem common international
to many
institution(s)
member
states?)
Source: Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1998, p.24.

Based on the theory and in line with the concept of people centeredness, we need
to determine if the people of East Africa are capable of influencing the process of
aggregation of national preferences to be incorporated at the regional level. In addition,
indicators should exist to show the people’s role in determining integration outcomes.
Victor Adetula has, for example, argued that:
…Regionalism has been a stronger force in East African politics...but its redefinition in the current context of EAC (II) needs to take consideration of …the
broad involvement of the peoples in the processes of regional integration.50
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Indeed Article VII of the EAC II Treaty enshrines people-centeredness, although
it adds a condition with which it must co-exist, namely, it must be “private sector-driven”
in order to become a reality.
In this chapter, I have examined the theoretical framework informing this study.
Having examined other related theoretical underpinnings common in the field of regional
integration, I have come to the determination that the study is best informed by liberal
inter-governmentalism theory. The theoretical framework underlines the central role of
domestic actors, whose interests are aggregated by the state and then brought to the
regional organizational setting. In the next chapter, I examine the contrast between EAC I
and II, both in terms of the role of people-centeredness and its utility in the possible
realization of the East African political federation.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Collapse of EAC I and Quick Transformation into EAC II
In order to contextualize the importance of people-centeredness to the East
African integration project, it is useful to analyze the reasons behind the collapse of the
EAC I in 1977. From that vantage point, it may then be possible to find out what may
have compelled the EAC II founding members to insist on the incorporation of peoplecenteredness in the Treaty for the Establishment of the EAC in 1999. Paragraph 4 of the
Preamble to the EAC II Treaty states:
…in 1977 the Treaty for East African Co-operation establishing the East African
Community was officially dissolved, the main reasons contributing to the collapse
of the East African Community being lack of strong political will, lack of strong
participation of the private sector and civil society in the co-operation activities.51
Also, in paragraph 11 of the Preamble, the Treaty details that the signatories are:
…Resolved to create an enabling environment in all the Partner States in order to
attract investments and allow the private sector and civil society to play a leading
role in the socio-economic development activities.52
Looking at the context just described, it appears from the outset that the EAC II
founders envisaged the participation of both the private sector and civil society in the
process of integration. It is an idea that had not been considered anywhere in the Treaty
establishing the EAC I. On the contrary, it appears that, at the time, the partner states had
felt no compunction to have their citizens too involved in the community’s affairs and
processes. That apathy in part contributed to the collapse of the EAC I.53
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Overview of Factors Leading to the Collapse of the EAC I
The origins of the East African Community (EAC) date as far back as 1900.
Today, the community is composed of five countries – Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania, and Uganda. The original members of the community, however, were for a
long time only the three countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. This was initially due
to colonial exigencies, wherein Kenya was a British colony, Uganda a British
Protectorate and Tanzania initially a German colony (up to 1918) and later a British
Mandated Territory (from 1919 to independence in1961). Burundi and Rwanda on the
other hand did not factor into the British regional colonial arrangement because they were
initially administered by Germany (from 1894 to 1915) and later (from1916 to 1962) by
Belgium as twin-mandated territories under the League of Nations.54
Administering the three territories under a British “regional” economic structure
made sense so in 1919, Mombasa (Kenya) was designated the first regional “customs
collection center.”55 Establishing the customs center would also help to consolidate and
simplify Britain’s access to raw materials for her industries in the territories.56 It would
also guarantee easier and more cost-efficient freighting of raw materials to England.
There were also other significant economic infrastructural realignments, apart
from the establishment of the Mombasa customs post. The building of the Kenya –
Uganda railway in the early 1900s also contributed significantly to a rapid shift in trade
from Tanganyika’s (now Tanzania) ports, especially Dar es Salaam and Tanga, to
Mombasa port. Given the fact that up to 1918 Tanganyika was still under German
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colonial rule, the move to strengthen Mombasa was an important one to the British
because it helped to curtail competition posed by both Dar es Salaam and Tanga ports.
Consequently, the British colonial government established an East African
Currency Board for Kenya and Uganda in 1904. In addition, following Germany’s defeat
in World War I, the League of Nations gave Tanganyika to Britain as a mandated
territory. The territories of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda were eventually conjoined
into a single customs union in 1919. A common market framework was also created for
the three territories in 1940, resulting in the free exchange of goods across the three
territories. A joint East African income tax board also came into existence in the same
year.
In 1948, the East African High Commission (EAHC), consisting of the governors
of the three territories and the East African Legislative Council (LEGCO), bestowed on
the commission the necessary legal basis for it to attain an international status. The
EAHC lasted up to 1961 when the East African Common Services Organization
(EACSO) was established.57 In 1963, after attaining their independence, the countries of
Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (later Tanzania) signed what is known as the Nairobi
Declaration. By virtue of the declaration, the partner states pledged to create a political
federation.
The federation did not materialize. Some of the causes for its non-establishment
included a lack of strong political will among the three countries’ political leaders and
existence of a perception of unequal sharing of the benefits of integration among the
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member states.58 Dani Wadada Nabudere had said that the failure was based on a myopic
view of “territorial nationalism,” wherein the interests of the ruling elites of the countries
and those of multinational corporations took center stage over the interests of the people.
Moreover, especially where the matter of “unequal sharing of benefits” was
concerned, the countries were left to squabble over the minute economic “crumbs” of
transfer taxes. They were thus all losers in a multinational corporation-dominated world,
which exploited all of them. In order to reverse that exploitative tendency, therefore, the
East African states would be better integrated. Political unity could be one of the most
feasible approaches to attain that goal.59
East Africa’s leaders, however, were not ready to surrender their territorial
nationalism, so they quickly ignored the proposal of a political federation that was the
basis of the Nairobi Declaration. Rather, the countries resorted to the idea of “balancing
trade” and “addressing imbalances” through the “distribution of industries which neither
state owned or controlled, because they were owned by private industry.60 To make the
new decision a reality, the founding fathers signed the Kampala and Mbale Agreements
of 1964 and 1965, respectively, which aimed mainly at re-allocating the various
industries, mostly based in Kenya, to the other two countries.
Kenya would not allow the relocation of any of the industries from within her
borders as such action would also mean tremendous job losses in the domestic labor
market while at the same time opening up labor competitions from both the Tanzanian
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and Ugandan markets, where some of the industries would now be based. To achieve
economies of scale, the newly relocated companies, finding Kenyan labor to be now
more expensive, would opt to source from the local labor market.
Based on those considerations, Kenya chose to not ratify the Kampala and Mbale
Agreements. On the other hand, Kenya’s decision to not allow the relocation of some of
her industrial franchises led Tanzania to apply separate tariffs against Kenyan goods,
which was uncharacteristic of any regional customs union or common market
arrangements. Finding out in reality that outright merging of their industrial and
economic capacities would not happen that quickly, the three countries finally decided to
sign the Treaty Establishing the EAC I in 1967.61
The EAC I: Short-lived Integration Experiment (1967-1977)
The Treaty establishing the EAC I immediately entered into force and allowed for
the immediate operationalization of an East African Common Market (EACM). The
EACM aimed at achieving a common customs tariff and trade deviation policy, the
protection of East African intra-regional trade, and increased inter-territorial trade.62
Those three areas of cooperation were crucial in enabling the EAC I to reduce conflicts of
interest and undue negative competition among its partner states. The states had thus
become a de facto free trade area, which opened up expanded market opportunities for
their territories.
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General Factors for the Collapse of the EAC I
But the EAC I was short-lived as it only took a decade to collapse (in 1977).
Rwekaza Mukandala and Nestor Luanda have summarized the reasons for its collapse as
follows: (a) the existence of different political philosophies (which in turn led each
country to pursue different economic policies); (b) a violent change of government by
military coup in Uganda in 1971; (c) continued perception by elements of the leaderships
in both Tanzania and Uganda that Kenya maintained an unfair advantage over the other
two members, resulting into inequitable sharing of the benefits of integration; (d) a lack
of policies capable of ensuring harmonization of the integration process in general; and
(e) the absence of strong civil society and private sector participation in the integration
process.63
As regards the differences in the three countries’ political philosophies, Kenya’s
capitalist-oriented economy was different from Tanzania’s declared “socialism and selfreliance” and Uganda’s “common man’s charter.”64 Essentially, Uganda’s policy was
both quasi-capitalist and socialist driven.65 Apparently, the different economic foci not
only reflected diverse macro and micro-economic policy frameworks but also contributed
to the drift, experienced by the three countries, away from deeper integration.
On the political front, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere had great distaste for General Idi
Amin Dada following the latter’s violent overthrow of President Milton Obote in 1971.
President Obote was Julius Nyerere’s personal friend, which ensured that he would never
sit with Amin at any EAC I summit meeting. Personality clashes between Nyerere and
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Amin eventually led to war between Tanzania and Uganda from 1978 to 1979. The
immediate cause of the war was Uganda’s annexation of part of Tanzanian territory in the
Northwestern Kagera Region, but it eventually resulted in Tanzania’s overthrow of the
regime in Kampala.66 By that time, General Amin had fled the country and abdicated
leadership for good.
The favorable conclusion of the war on Tanzania’s side allowed for the
reinstatement of Milton Obote in 1979, but could not save the community from its
collapse.67 As a result of the Nyerere-Amin standoff, the EAC Summit could not convene
from 1971 to 1977. By that time, the drums of war between the two countries had already
reached their crescendo.
In addition, given the organization’s top-down, command-oriented mode of
decision-making, no major activity would be allowed to take place, whether in terms of
budgetary appropriations or any policy-oriented initiatives. It was only a matter of time
before the members officially acknowledged their organization’s collapse.
As regards the perception about inequitable distribution of the benefits of
integration in favor of Kenya, this was rooted in the pre-independence era. It will be
recalled that, of the three countries, Kenya had been favored by the British colonial
administration in 1919 when Mombasa became the customs center and its port the hub of
British export/import trade on the East African coast.
Recognizing that imbalance from the inception of the community in 1967, the
partner states introduced specific mechanisms in the region’s trade regime, which were
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intended to reduce Kenya’s industrial advantage over Tanzania and Uganda.68 Among the
mechanisms adopted was the establishment of a transfer tax system, which was intended
to benefit Tanzania and Uganda by boosting their industrial competitiveness with Kenya.
The transfer tax, it was thought, would encourage the development of manufacturing
industries in the two countries and help to protect their markets against Kenyan goods.69
The result however was different. Instead of benefitting the two countries, the tax
transfer system brought about a negative impact on Tanzanian and Ugandan industries.
Mohabe Nyirabu points out that, rather than bolstering industrial development in the two
countries, the transfer tax policy at best only allowed for a mushrooming of small to
medium scale industrial units. In addition, the industrial units operated at comparatively
higher costs than the larger and more advanced units in Kenya. This then resulted in trade
diversion instead of trade creation for Tanzania and Uganda, leaving Kenya to retain a
manufacturing and commercial edge over the other two, who remained underdogs.70
Lack of People-centeredness as a Key Factor for the Collapse of EAC I
Lack of people-centeredness has been mentioned widely in the literature on EAC
I integration as among the principal factors for the organization’s collapse in 1977.71 The
general argument here is that, the organization was not rooted in popular legitimacy. It is
thus assumed that, had popular support existed from the inception of the EAC I, the
political leaders would have had to reconsider any possibilities likely to lead to its
collapse. That is because any political arrangement with popular support from the people
68
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is likely to penalize politicians who make it fail and to reward those who make it succeed.
Whereas penalties may be made manifest by election losses, rewards may be measured
simply by the re-election of politicians who succeed.
Because the EAC I had come into existence solely based on the whims of the
three countries’ political leadership instead of being based on popular support from
across the population, there were no penalties to be expected from the electorate. On the
contrary, it seems that the political leadership had unabridged powers to decide on the
fate of the EAC I – whether in a positive or negative direction, thereby completely
ignoring any role for the people. Dani Wadada Nabudere has argued that, “peoplecenteredness” was not even a concept to be considered when the EAC I founders created
the organization in 1967.72
Much of the rationalization for people-centeredness is deeply linked to the history
of East African societies on the one hand, and Western European colonialism on the
other. Thus, although in the pre-colonial era the societies and peoples of East Africa were
traditionally interlinked in almost synonymous societies spanning present-day borders,
the colonial borders which the EAC states inherited from their British former colonizers
also completely distorted the pre-colonial borderless status.
Following the drawing of artificial boundaries at the Berlin Conference in 18841885 in what constituted the “Scramble for Africa,” ethnic groups spanning the imposed
borders such as the Luos and Maasai in Kenya and Tanzania were mercilessly divided
into communities within the different countries. To date, the border peoples of East
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Africa continue to cross the borders, without recourse to or care for visa or immigration
requirements. Had the populations across the EAC partner states been comprehensively
involved in the integration processes, it is likely that EAC I integration might have been
more people-supported than merely seeming to be the work and drive of the EAC
governments.
Mukandala and Luanda point out that the lack of strong participation of civil
society and the private sector in the cooperation activities contributed to the collapse of
the EAC I in 1977.73 In fact, the two authors note that the lack of popular participation of
the people of East Africa was so profound that the majority of East Africans remained
indifferent to the disintegration of the EAC I, even as it reached its official demise in
1977.74 In essence, that indifference appeals almost to some form of common sense: why
would the population be concerned with the plight of an organization in which they had
no stake?
In terms of decision-making, the Summit centralized the organization’s processes,
ideally based on recommendations from the Council of Ministers and the Secretariat,
respectively, but almost solely based on the presidents’ personal wishes. As a result, the
East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) was merely a consultative organ, rather than
an authoritative legislative entity, as it ought to have been. As such, the Council of
Ministers and/or the Summit could override the EALA’s legislative decisions at any
time.75
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Based on the preceding analysis, it is no surprise that even the articles for the
dissolution of the EAC I were not submitted to the EALA for deliberation. That lack of
popular involvement, even at the representative democratic level of the EALA, also
serves to highlight the point that the organization remained leadership-centered. Thus,
when the heads of state decided they had no use for the organization, the EAC I was
dissolved.76
The EAC II: Rapid Transformation of an Old Integration Idea
Following the collapse of the EAC I and after a transition period in which the
partner states negotiated and reached agreement on the transfer of common assets, a
process which was completed in 1984, an EAC II was re-established in 1999.The reestablishment was a significant event in that it provided an opportunity to ensure that the
problems experienced in the EAC I would not recur in the new arrangement. These
included the inherent lack of a unified vision for development which had afflicted the
EAC I.
However, it is interesting that a similar lack of unified vision for joint regional
development seems to persist to date within the context of the EAC II. Jacqueline
Braveboy-Wagner notes, “the EAC II is perhaps the most ambitious political and
economic program of the RECs, but lingering political differences and differing levels of
development are still obstacles to rapid progress in integration.”77 Looked at in the
context of its predecessor, that “most ambitious of Africa’s RECs” known as EAC II is
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fraught with integration challenges, including difficulties in the realization of a political
federation.78
In Article 5.2 of the EAC II Treaty, the partner states expressed their will to
achieve a federation. The EAC Development Strategy (2006 – 2010) included a focus on
facilitating the process towards the realization of a political federation. Evidence related
to the continued desire for the federation is reflected in some of the political leadership’s
official undertakings. For example, by a decision made at their summit in Nairobi on 27–
29 August 2004, the EAC II’s heads of state expressed a collective “concern at the slow
pace of integration,”79 and decided to form a “Committee on Fast Tracking the EAC
Political Federation.”80 Also dubbed the “Wako Committee” due to the name of its Chair,
the Committee was charged with carrying out region-wide consultations among East
Africans, in order to determine their general willingness to become part of an East
African Federation.81
The Wako Committee submitted its report to the regular summit meeting of the
EAC Heads of State in Arusha on 29 November 2004. Among its recommendations was
a blunt admonition to the (EAC II) heads of state that they would do better to refrain from
attempting to forge a “leadership-driven federation.” Rather the committee advised that
the organization needed to become more citizenry-driven in order to reach the political
federation goal. Thus, the committee argued in part that:
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…A sound foundation is needed to create a sustainable Political Federation. One
contributor to such sustainability requires that the process towards Political
Federation be reached through public mobilization pressure rather than through
executive decisions…A public referendum process is desirable, since large
numbers of the people of East Africa have stated very clearly that they want not
only to understand what a Federation is, but also own it and participate in its
formation…The process…will partly depend on the design and implementation of
the strategic interventions during the period prior to the establishment of a
Federation, and partly on the involvement of the people of East Africa, including
the private sector, civil society organizations, and the professional bodies, among
others. 82
The Wako committee’s findings were an initial eye-opener concerning the
prospects of incorporating a “people-centered” approach to attain the political federation.
The problem with that report, however was that it fell short of exploring or suggesting
what avenues would be useful to ensure the popular participation of EAC II citizens in
order to foster people centeredness. As such, that lack of guidance did not expand the
rationale for implementing people-centeredness to the benefit of EAC II integration. For
that reason, further guidance could be obtained from Article 7 of the EAC II Treaty,
which details the key objectives for the establishment of the Community as being, inter
alia:
a. Improving the standard of living and quality of life of the people of East
Africa;
b. Ensuring balanced, orderly, consistent and fair development in East Africa;
c. Promoting the active participation and benefit of the people in development;
d. Enabling the business community and the general public to play a leading
role; and
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e. Strengthening and improving the role of women in development.
A number of these objectives are directly linked to people-centeredness; they
include although may not be limited to, active participation and benefit of the people in
development, allowing the business community and general public to play a leading role
in the community’s affairs, as well as improving the role of women in development.
What is important is that, the EAC II treaty appears to be specific on the potential peoplecenteredness may have in EAC II integration. However, the zeal to allow that to happen
has been missing. This is a view also expressed by Andrew Kiondo, who argued that
involvement of the people in integration was not among the organization’s strongest suits
even during the commencement of EAC II integration.83
In this thesis, I am therefore interested in objectives c, d and e, above, in line of
Article 7 of the treaty. In the next chapter I explore my first question: What institutional
mechanisms are in place within the EAC II’s decision-making processes, which would
require incorporation of the views of the East African peoples? And, if such mechanisms
exist, are they functioning as planned?
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CHAPTER FOUR
EAC II Decision-making Mechanisms
This chapter examines EAC II institutions to assess the extent to which the
organization’s institutional decision-making mechanisms are designed to allow for the
input of civil society. If there are no such mechanisms then, despite the importance
people centeredness is accorded in the EAC II charter, the idea should be regarded as
rhetorical instead of concrete.
EAC II Institutional Structures
An organization’s institutional structures and how they relate to its functioning
and sustainability could be important indicators enabling one to gauge that organization’s
ability to achieve its objectives. In the case of the EAC II, Article 9 of the Treaty details
the principal structures through which the organization functions. Those structures (or
organs) of the community are: the Summit, Council of Ministers, Coordinating
Committees, sectoral committees, the East African Court of Justice, the East African
Legislative Assembly (EALA), the Secretariat, and “such other organs as may be
established by the Summit.”84
The Summit and its Omnipotent Decision-making Powers
The Summit is the final, hence most powerful decision-making organ of the EAC
II. It thus retains its place “at the heart”85 of the EAC II just as was the case during the era
of the EAC I. The summit is where the EAC II heads of state meet in order to give overall
direction to the organization. As such, the organ has sweeping powers on virtually
everything that concerns the working and continuing existence of the EAC II.
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For example, by virtue of Article 9 (1) (h) of the treaty, the Summit is the sole
organ mandated to create subordinate institutions in the EAC II. This is a function the
Summit can carry out, as it deems appropriate, without any limitations. Similarly, Article
11 alludes to the Summit’s omnipotent powers of appointment and removal of judges of
the East African Court of Justice, without recourse to any other body. Article11 too
provides that the Summit admits new members and/or grants observer status to foreign
countries, just as it must also assent to (or dissent on) bills that may have been passed by
the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA).86
The significance of the Summit’s unilaterally sweeping powers (without
democratic safeguards to put them in check) is that, it literally counteracts the treaty’s
declared objective of establishing a people-centered EAC II. This concern is further
reinforced by the consensual mode of decision-making employed by the Summit in line
with Article 12(3) of the treaty. The treaty provision clearly states that the Summit shall
“reach its decisions by consensus.”87
To optimize its decision-making, the EAC II could benefit from the experiences
of the European Economic Community (EEC), which initially also utilized the consensus
mode of decision-making. In 1966, President Charles de Gaulle instructed all French
delegates to the EEC to oppose all measures being debated until the membership agreed
to a better mode of decision-making other than consensus. De Gaulle’s belief was that
France would be short-changed if she deemed a measure was important to her national
interests but smaller states did not feel as strongly about it. At the same time, smaller
states in the EEC could be disadvantaged by bigger states if the latter banded together to
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pass a measure more advantageous to them than to the former. In the end, it was apparent
that the consensus mode of decision-making risked organizational sustainability.88
The EEC eventually adopted both the qualified majority vote (QMV) system in
order to safeguard the interests of smaller states, and the veto power to thereby
accommodate interests across the membership, taking into account France’s eminently
pro-integration political stance, and the need to ensure that regional interests already
achieved would not be regressed.89
The EAC II can hardly claim to be impervious to similar challenges as the EEC
faced more than 40 years ago. This reality becomes apparent when one or more of the
rest of the membership appear to be obstructionists. For example in June-August 2013
three of the Community’s member states, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda,90 decided to
move forward with a cross-border railway infrastructural construction project ending up
at Mombasa Port, thereby likely to undermine Tanzania’s ports, rather than linking them
with the rest of the region. Although Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda had cited the principle
of “variable geometry” enshrined in Article 7(3) of the EAC II Treaty as the justification
for moving forward without Tanzania and Burundi, authorities in Tanzania argued that
the cited provision of the treaty only allowed for flexible implementation of some aspects
of integration variously by member states, and that such allowance did not extend to only
a few of the member states establishing “coalitions of the willing” to decide on major
EAC II decisions without the consensus of the other members.91
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Where people-centeredness is concerned, the Summit’s omnipotence in decisionmaking does not provide room for the “people” of East Africa to counteract their heads of
state especially when the latter seem to be making controversial decisions that the people
may wish to reverse. Non-governmental organizations, professional associations and the
East African Bussiness Council (EABC) are not allowed observer status at the Summit
level meetings and other senior decision-making and bureaucratic/advisory meetings.
However, Civil society and business communities may hold debates and nongovernmental sector-oriented consultations on particular areas of integration and formally
submit reports to the Secretariat for conveyance to the partner states.
For example, on March 8, 2014, the East African Law Society (EALS) formally
filed Case Reference No.1 of 2014 in the EACJ against the Government of the Republic
of Burundi. In the lawsuit, the EALS bemoaned allegations of extrajudicial killings and
persecution of the political opposition in Burundi, which the EALS argued amounted to
the Government’s violations of its obligations under Articles 6(d) and 7(d) of the EAC II
treaty. The provisions require that the partner states abide by the principles of good
governance, adherence to the rule of law, and social justice as well as adherence to the
principles of human rights.92 The EALS has therefore requested the EACJ to compel the
EAC Secretary-General to “evaluate and advise on whether Burundi [was] still in
consonance with those fundamental principles that underpinned the EAC.”93 Although
the case remains on-going in the EACJ, a guilty finding against Burundi could entail
adoption by the Council of Ministers and Summit of the EALS proposal to allow
application of sanctions, against Burundi by the other partner states, under Articles 146
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and 147 of the treaty. It could also create a precedent with regard to actions civil society
actors in the EAC II can undertake to enable them to actively participate in the affairs of
the community. The role of civil society is discussed further in the last section of this
chapter.
The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers plays an important policy-setting role. It consists of the
ministers responsible for regional integration from each partner state. Like the Summit,
the Council is fully “state-centric” in that it does not involve any actors outside the
executive branch of member states in its deliberations. The Council also provides support
and monitors implementation of its decisions in the national context across the partner
states. It also prepares legislation to be tabled in the East African Legislative Assembly
(EALA).
Ultimately, the Council must report and submit its recommendations to the
Summit for approval. In addition, all the sectoral committees detailed in the treaty must
follow a similar approval process. However actors outside the executive realm of
governments cannot present their views to the council.
The East African Court of Justice
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) is one of two organs of the EAC II
(together with the East African Legislative Assembly -EALA) which have a better chance
to showcase the incorporation of people-centeredness into the community. Charged with
ensuring “adherence to the law in the interpretation and application of and compliance
with [the] Treaty,”94 the EACJ is supposed to be autonomous from the partner states in its
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work. However, a number of legal bottlenecks present challenges to the functioning of
the institution. Those challenges beg the question of the extent to which the judicial
autonomy of the EACJ can be safeguarded. Three main characteristics relate to this. I
analyze each of them in detail below.
Firstly, under Article 24 (1) of the Treaty, the judges of the EACJ are directly
appointed by the Summit, without recourse to consultations with either professional
organizations or parliaments of the partner states they come from. As a result, given the
lack of oversight in the appointment process, there is likelihood of cronyism. The judges
remain accountable to their heads of state, which then begs the question of guaranteeing
judicial independence, given that the justices remain answerable to their respective
national appointing authorities. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that,
despite their being appointed to serve on the EACJ bench, the judges still retain their
respective national judicial positions. This is a recipe for conflict of interest, especially
when judges are asked to rule against their primary employers, i.e. the national
governments.
Secondly, when the partner states enacted the EAC II Treaty, they slipped in a
number of claw-back clauses, some of which the EACJ has had to rule against as being
contrary to the spirit and objectives of the treaty. The relevance of this argument is well
documented in the EACJ’s landmark ruling in the case of Prof. Anyang’ Nyong’o and 10
others v. the Attorney General Kenya, the Clerk of the EALA, and the Secretary-General
of the EAC and 4 others (interveners) 2006.95
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The circumstances of the case were that the claimants alleged to the Court (EACJ)
that Kenya’s nine Members to the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) in 2005
were elected from only one political party, which contravened the spirit of Article 50(1)
of the EAC II Treaty. The treaty provision requires EALA members to be elected from as
wide a national representational spectrum as possible, ranging from across a nation’s
political parties represented in parliament, including various opinion, gender, and special
interest groups according to procedures set by each partner state’s parliament.96
The claimants requested that the Court strike down said presidential
appointments, as they were null and void, and order the Government of Kenya to elect its
members to the EALA from parliament, as was the practice in the other partner states.
The case involved the Clerk of the EALA and Secretary-General of the EAC because
they had already accepted the appointees as Members of the EALA. During his
submissions to the Court, the Attorney-General of Kenya, as Respondent in the case,
pointed to the jurisdictional limits of the EACJ enshrined in Article 27(1) of the EAC II
Treaty, which refers to the EACJ only as a Court of initial jurisdiction.97 Consequently, in
the opinion of the Kenyan Government, the EACJ had no jurisdiction in the matter at
hand, which was to be deemed as inherently within the domestic purview of the EAC II
partner state.
In its determination, the Court indeed agreed that Article 27 (1) of the EAC II
Treaty was attempting to limit its powers by declaring that the Court “shall initially have
jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of [the] Treaty.”98 Thus the use of the
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term “initially” in Art.27 (1) left the implication that “final” jurisdiction over the
provisions of the treaty rested with the national courts of the partner states rather than the
EACJ as an ideal referral court. As a matter of jurisprudential premise, however, the
Court invoked its jurisdiction based on the tenets of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 1969 to which all the EAC II partner states are signatories. Accordingly, the
EACJ called for uniform application of all (EAC II) treaty provisions by the partner states
because they all had uniform stake in the organization.99 At least in the specific case
under reference, the Government of Kenya eventually reversed its decision and
eventually implemented the Court’s decision a couple of years later.
In accordance with articles 26 and 27 of the Vienna Convention 1969, the EACJ
also required the partner states to observe two key principles enshrined in the
Convention: The first principle is that of pacta sunt servanda (i.e. agreements, once
made, must be respected). The second principle the Court required the partner states to
observe was the prohibition that “no party to a treaty shall invoke its internal laws as
justification for not observing or failing to perform the obligations it entered into under
the treaty.”100 The basis of the latter argument was rooted in Article 31 of the Vienna
Convention, which stipulates that treaty interpretation has to be based “on good faith”
and in accordance with the “ordinary meaning, object and purpose”101 of the treaty.
The EACJ also took issue with Article 50 of the EAC II Treaty. The Article
provides for the election of the members of the EALA but leaves open the manner in
which the national assemblies in the respective partner states would carry out the
elections. In the Court’s opinion, the partner states needed to make a conscious decision
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to cede some of their sovereign powers to the broader regional interest. This would
enable the partner states to submit uniformly to a common set of regional legal standards
where the EACJ would have jurisdiction.
To-date, the landmark EACJ ruling just explained has not been domesticated by
any of the partner states, a reality also observed by Stefan Reith and Moritz Boltz who
said in 2011 that, it was rather an unfortunate omission that no partner states’ national
courts had been able to refer to the important precedent set by that EACJ ruling.102
Where people-centeredness is concerned, this is one area where the influence of
professional associations such as the East African Law Society and the national law
societies in each member state as well as NGOs could have provided much needed
pressure on the governments to better observe the rule of law. This would include
ensuring that the partner states’ governments honor the rulings of the EACJ as ordered.
To-date, the much-lamented EACJ jurisdictional state of affairs remains, requiring
change from within and across the partner states.
The East African Legislative Assembly (EALA)
Established under Chapter 9 of the EAC II Treaty, the EALA should be the most
people-centered institution of the community. The institution has however been said to
“lack much popular legitimacy and input from civil society.”103 Also it lacks any
significant influence over the partner states’ governments’ decisions regarding the
process of integration. For example, although the EALA passes laws, most of the bills
brought to its floor come from the Council (of Ministers) while only a minority of the
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bills comes privately from the legislators. In addition, given the lack of a regionally
binding legal system embodied in the EACJ, the EAC II governments have unmitigated
freedom to cherry-pick from the legislation the EALA adopts.
The composition of the EALA is set under Article 48 of the treaty, to be nine
members from each of the partner states. The general election criteria are set in Article
50(1),namely that the members are to be elected by the respective national parliaments
“not from among the members” and that the elections be as broadly representative of the
country’s population, political parties, gender and special interest groups as possible. But
uniform procedures for those elections do not exist.104 This is a source of national
disagreements in some of the partner states as discussed earlier in the Kenyan case before
the EACJ.105
At present it is still difficult for the EALA to play a role significant enough to
legally call on the accountability of the governments, because its members’ lack linkage
to the national electorates, hence the people of East Africa. The election procedures need
to be amended to ensure that EALA candidates are either elected directly by their
national electorates so they would report to them or, if elected by the national parliaments
as is currently the case, then they should be able to report to the parliament in as regular
and transparent manner as possible. This will have the advantage of making the EAC II
integration agenda more of a matter for national debate and public involvement.
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Overview of people-centeredness in the EAC II’s institutional decisionmaking processes
In sum, where the functioning of the EAC II’s principal organs is concerned,
credible evidence does not so far exist to show that the organization’s institutional
decision-making processes benefit in any regularized fashion from incorporating the
people’s views. Civil society organizations are unable to send reports to the Summit
directly, although they can hold debates and make recommendations to other organs.
Also, although the EAC parliament is representative to some degree still no formal
mechanisms exist that would enable wider participation of civil society or the people at
large in the election of their representatives to the EAC parliament.
Thus, given that absence of such linkages between most of the EAC institutions
and the people, it is not surprising that J. Oloka-Onyango’s concludes that the mere
mention of people-centeredness in the EAC II Treaty does not in any concrete way
constitute popular participation.106 The reality seems to be that, the organization’s
decision-making mechanisms, as well as its survival, continue to remain firmly in the
hands of the EAC political elite, in particular the Executive Branch, whose role is
epitomized by the Summit. For that reason, Oloka-Onyango’s answer to the title of,
“Who Owns the East African Community?”107 is that the traditional “strong leaders’
ownership” of the community, which so tragically dogged the EAC I, seems to have been
carried over into the EAC II.
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The East African Business Council as Representative of the Private Sector
The East African Business Council (EABC) is the umbrella organization
representing the private sector within the EAC II region. The EABC was established in
1997 and comprises a variety of member organizations in the region. They include 54
Associations and 102 corporate members.108 The association members of the EABC,
include: “all National Private sector apex bodies, four manufacturing associations, five
Chambers of Commerce, three Employer Associations, two Women Associations, two
Bankers Associations and the Confederation of Informal Sector Associations of East
Africa.”109
The EABC does not, however, seem to have any formalized way to influence
EAC II policy or strongly lobby the partner states’ governments to deliver on their treaty
obligations, both for people-centered and private sector driven integration. A report on
January 26, 2014, alluded to the EABC’s own frustrations with attempting to influence
developments within the EAC II towards deeper integration. The report laments that the
EAC II governments have not implemented protocols they have already signed and
ratified. These include the implementation of a single EAC tourist visa, abolishing
working permits across the member states, and abolishing all non-tariff barriers to trade
and industrial production. The partner states have not also allowed the use of national
identity documents (IDs) for their citizens as they travel within the region; rather national
passports are still required of EAC travelers.110 As recently as January 2014, the EABC
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was still planning to lobby the respective EAC presidents individually, country to
country, to ask them to speed up the process of regional integration.111
Looking at all the hurdles in the area of business that the EABC continues to face,
it is worthwhile to note that the organization was established (in 1997), so it was already
in operation by the time the EAC II treaty was signed in 1999. That it is still unable to
have formal lobbying mechanisms in place, capable of influencing decisions at the
national and EAC-wide level in favor of the business community speaks to its still
nascent capability to engage within the EAC in a manner beneficial to its member
organizations’ interests. The EABC provided inputs during the making of the EAC II
treaty, hence the recognition of the role of the private sector in the community’s
integration processes. In fact, the framers of the treaty accorded that role much
importance by enshrining it in Article 127(1b) of the treaty, which states clearly that:
“…The partner states agree to provide opportunities for entrepreneurs to participate
actively in improving the policies and activities of the institutions of the community that
affect them.”112 How the EABC has ended up not being central to the EAC II’s decisionmaking is the subject of another research study. The reality is however that business is
not influential as might have been expected.
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Gender Groups, Civil Society and Community Based Organizations’ (CBOs) Roles
in EAC Institutional Mechanisms and Processes
It is rather curious that the EABC lists gender groups among its member
organizations, since they are usually seen as part of the broader civil society and
community-based organizations (CSOs and CBOs) framework. However, in East Africa,
women are very much engaged in small business enterprises.
Article 121 of the EAC II’s treaty explicitly recognizes the role of women and
their ability to make a significant contribution to socio-economic transformation and
sustainable growth; their full participation in the community at the institutional level is
seen as imperative. It is for that reason that Lwaitama, Kasombo and Mkumbo113 have
underlined the importance accorded to the word “women” in the treaty, wherein it is
mentioned 20 times, a frequency only rivaled by the mention of “private sector” (22
times). On the other hand, the terminology “civil society” appears13 times in the treaty,
and “citizens” 5 times.114
It is ironical that, despite “women” being accorded such prominence in the treaty,
they still lack organized participation in the affairs of the community as a unified gender
group. However, Lwaitama, Kasombo and Mkumbo115 may have hinted to part of the
explanation for the dire state of affairs. The authors argued that, despite women’s
involvement in business in the respective individual countries of the EAC, where the
community and cross-border trade are concerned, women’s involvement has remained
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informal, mainly manifested either in smaller scale or illegal cross-border trading. This
has resulted in women’s participation not featuring prominently as a net cross-border
contribution.
This line of argument is supported by Masheti Masinjila,116 whose research study
on the gender dimensions of cross border trade within the EAC came to a similar
conclusions that, the participation of women in regional cross-border trade had not been
affected in any way by the adoption of the Customs Union.117 Masinjila’s argues that:
…informal cross border women traders across the region do not use available
formal systems/structures for most of their transactions. This makes it difficult for
regional trade policy initiatives such as under East African Community (EAC)
and the Customs Protocol to have any significant impact on this informal trade by
women. The women show little evidence of knowledge regarding the East African
Community Customs Protocol and even less motivation to use it to facilitate
trading activities. Women traders continue to trade, largely the same way they
have done for many decades gone by as admitted by [the] majority of respondents
who have been in the trade for over ten years. Preference for the old way of
conducting informal cross border trade was evident in the manner in which
women traders operating through Kenya for a considerable period of time
expressed their doubts or outright discomfort with the opening up of trade under
the evolving customs protocol…118
What is even more interesting is Masinjila’s finding that cross-border traders, including
women who were interviewed, expressed their desire that governments not open up more
region-wide trade opportunities as a result of the customs union protocol because it
would “attract more traders eager to take advantage of attendant opportunities to the
detriment of current traders.”119 Views like this may perhaps have not existed 10 years
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after the re-establishment of the EAC, if the community had remained true to its charter
and ensured a truly broad-based people-centered approach to integration.
In addition, where EAC women traders are concerned, Masinjila’s study noted
that the majority of those interviewed (59.7%) conceded that their cross-border trade
linkages, like those of many generations before them, remained only informal, based
either on their ethnic origins across the border or on mutual social needs, such as the
traders’ needs to send their children to cheaper schools in the neighboring country, for
example in Kenya education costs are higher than in neighboring Uganda.120
Civil Society/Community Based Organizations Participation in EAC Institutional
Processes
Even though the EAC II charter has a seemingly straightforward objective of
incorporating civil society into the EAC II decision- making, actual implementation
remains limited. This reality has been bemoaned by Lwaitama et al, who have argued that
the difficulty of incorporating CBOs and other non-governmental organizations into the
EAC institutional processes does not only manifest itself at the regional level, but stems
from the partner states’ local environment. Using Tanzania as an example, the authors
argue that, where these groups exist and try to exert influence locally, they are mostly
elitist and urban-based, without the ability or will to reach the rural areas where the
majority of the population are.121
An additional problem is that EAC II member states legally limit the operations of
CSOs in their countries. In the case of Tanzania, for example, the Non-Government
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Organizations Act No.24 of 2002 and Societies Act Cap.337, R.E. 2002 all limit the
activities of CSOs and CBOs by broadly requiring them to abstain from being partisan to
any political party or position, in the course of their advocacies. Contravention of that
regulation is risky for the CSO or CBO concerned as any of them so accused, usually
faces de-registration.122 Based on that legal stipulation against CSOs and CBOs therefore,
any campaigns they may wish to conduct in relation to the attainment of the East African
political federation or the fast tracking of the community, would be deemed “political.” It
is therefore not surprising that, like their gender counterparts, CSOs and CBOs have not
featured prominently enough in EAC efforts to attain or fast track the federation.
In the next chapter, I discuss one attempt by the partner states in 2004 to solicit
the views of the broader population specifically on the possibility of fast tracking the
political federation
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CHAPTER FIVE
Establishment of the Wako Committee as a Non-institutionalized
Attempt to People-centeredness
In August 2004, the EAC II Summit decided that the East African Federation
should be fast tracked. This decision was not novel, given the fact that formation of the
EAC I in 1967 had only come about as a result of the failure of the Nairobi Declaration of
1963, which had sought to establish an East African Political Federation.
What factors led to this decision in 2004? Dani Wadada Nabudere provides some
explanations regarding the new dynamics. Nabudere’s argument is that the “fast tracking”
idea had come from Uganda’s President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, who had suddenly
developed a ‘’vision’’ that the federation and integration of the region had to occur before
he retired.”123 Museveni’s pronouncements had been quoted in the public media for some
time. Importantly, the Summit reached the decision to fast track but wanted to explore
how best it would be achieved. The leadership decided to form a committee, tasking
Kenya’s Attorney General, Amos Wako, to head it.
The Wako Committee on fast tracking the East African Federation was thus
formed during the extraordinary Summit meeting of the EAC Heads of State held in
Nairobi on August 27–29, 2004. At the meeting, Presidents Mwai Kibaki, Yoweri
Museveni and Benjamin Mkapa of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, respectively, decided
that it would be good to accelerate the process of integration in order to achieve the
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“ultimate goal of political federation through a fast track mechanism.”124 Among the
Wako Committee’s terms of reference (TORs) was the requirement to discern the
“feelings” of the broader population of East Africa on the possibility of fast tracking the
federation. The Summit also requested that the Committee submit its report for
consideration within three months. The report was submitted on November 30, 2004.125
Records of the Wako Committee’s work show that it consulted, via interviews,
with all three EAC heads of state, ministers, permanent secretaries and senior officials
from all three EAC governments. The Committee also consulted academicians,
parliamentarians and members of the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), civic
leaders, representatives of EAC business communities, and “ordinary” (sic!) East
Africans.”126 What is most important is the fact that, along with the expected respondents
from the political and bureaucratic elites, the Wako Committee also consulted with
“ordinary” East Africans.127This would be the first ever large-scale broad consultation of
its kind; it deserves that recognition.
Composition of the Wako Committee
The Wako Committee was chaired by Mr. Amos Wako (Attorney General of the
Republic of Kenya at the time) and included Prof. Haidari Amani (Tanzania as the Vice
Chairman and Dr. Ezra Suruma (Uganda) as Secretary. The presidents also appointed
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three other associate members –one from each partner state - based on their respective
presidents’ national preferences.128
The Wako Report’s Conclusions and Recommendations
The Wako Committee submitted its report to the ordinary session of the Summit
in Arusha, Tanzania, on November 30, 2004. In the voluminous 378-page report, the
committee provided a lengthy expose on what plagued EAC II integration, and proposed
what would be done to correct it. I discuss some of the Committee’s conclusions and
recommendations in brief.
Firstly, the Committee argued in its report that a sound foundation was required
for the EAC II in order to build a sustainable federation. To achieve that, the federation
needed to be based on both the popular support of the majority of East Africans and on a
sound regional economic base. Only then, it was argued, would East Africans identify
with the federation as their own, enabling the organization’s survival.129
Thus the Wako committee members remained convinced of the necessity for
people-centeredness to remain at the center of the EAC II integration process. The
Committee also advised that, in order to attain popular support for the federation, the
partner states should endeavor to hold referenda, whose objective would be to “sensitize
the people about the benefits and merits of the federation and to allow them to express
their views.”130
Secondly, the Wako report called for rectification of anomalies found in the
relationships exhibited by some of the key institutions of the EAC II, especially the
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EALA and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ). For the EALA, the problem
remained that partner states could elect the members of the institution from each state in
accordance with Article 50 of the treaty but not use a uniform rule in doing so.131 As we
saw in the last chapter, ultimately, the EALA members, being elected to office through
their respective national parliaments are not accountable to the public, but to the national
assemblies. In the case of the EACJ, the non-binding character of its decisions was cause
for concern. This was due to the stipulation under Article 27(1) of the Treaty that the
EACJ was only for initial jurisdiction on matters concerning the EAC II. 132 This left the
final jurisdiction of referrals to national courts instead of the EACJ. The lack of
commitment by the partner states in that regard remained problematic.

The Wako Committee’s report proposed a specific timeline and phases within
which it thought it would be possible to attain the federation. It was envisaged that a
maximum of 5 years was needed to realize the feat, based on three phases. The first
phase, a prelude phase (2004-5), required a display of the political will to federate by the
EAC II leadership. Given the fact that the leadership had demonstrated that when it
formed the committee, the Wako Report concluded that the prelude phase would hardly
span more than one year.133 The second phase was to be a transitional phase (2006-2009).
This entailed systemic implementation of the three core remaining stages of integration
before attaining the federation: a Customs Union, a Common Market and Monetary
Union. The three stages would be attained quickly in an “overlapping and parallel”
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fashion, especially because they all depended on the need for the partner states to
harmonize their economic and fiscal policies and as well as governance and
administrative structures.
The report further argued that success in economic integration would provide the
foundation to achieve the federation. Hence concurrent regional programs had to be
undertaken in the areas of infrastructural development, science and technology, as well as
constitutional and financial aspects. The Report went on to forecast that the East African
Political Federation could be launched by January 1, 2010, when the first federal
president would be sworn in.134 The last phase, a consolidation phase (2010-2013) would
follow the swearing in of the East African federal president. During this phase, a federal
electoral system would be put in place, enabling the Federal State of East Africa to fully
discharge its local and international responsibilities.135
In its conclusions, the Wako Committee gave the rationale for the establishment
of a fast tracked federation as two-fold: One, that it would be a “catalyst for economic
growth,” and two, that it would serve as a “major pillar for the attainment and
maintenance of peace, political stability and security in the member states.”136 The
Committee further argued that the federation would avert the possibility of East African
states fighting each other.137
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Collection of Views on fast tracking from East Africans through National
Consultation Committees (NCC)
In the aftermath of the submission of the Wako Report to the Summit in
November 2004, the political leadership decided that it would need wider consultations
with the people of East Africa in order to go ahead with fast tracking the federation. The
consultations would help the EAC II leadership to get the necessary political support
from their citizens, at the respective national levels.
During their Extraordinary Summit meeting in May 2005 at Dar es Salaam,
therefore, the EAC II presidents instructed the Council of Ministers to establish National
Consultative Committees (NCC) on fast tracking the East African federation. The EAC
Secretary-General would chair the effort. The partner states (Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda) launched their NCC simultaneously on 13thOctober 2006, tasking them to
submit their reports by November 2008. The following discussion analyses the NCC
consultation outcomes.
Composition of the NCC
The overall composition of the NCC generally differed from one country to
another, without uniform criteria. As a result, where Kenya’s NCC membership totaled
33 persons (28 males, 5 females), Tanzania’s total stood at 18 persons (12 males, 6
females) and Uganda’s stood at 19 people (14 males, 5 females). Table 5.1 (below)
depicts that composition:
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Table 5.1: Composition of the NCC for Each Partner State
Country

Total No. of
Members per NCC

Male

Female

(By head count)

(By head count)

Kenya

33

28

5

Tanzania

18

12

6

Uganda

19

14

5

Source: EAC Secretariat, Reports from the National Consultative Committees on Fast
Tracking the East African Political Federation, August 2007.

The NCCs varied in their scope of work from one partner state to another, each
national authority making its decisions based on its own local conditions. For that reason,
while the general methodological approach to the consultations can be discussed, issues
pertaining to statistical significance and errors will be ignored. In addition, because each
country conducted the consultations in a different way, it is difficult to compare them in
terms of the breadth of consultations. However even accounting for population size,
Tanzania seems to have drawn the largest proportion of participants. Below, Table 5.2
depicts a summary of the scope and methods of the consultations carried out in each
country.
Table 5.2: Summary of Scope and Methods of Consultations by the NCC
Kenya
a. Household survey:
5,000 households
targeted, 5,000
responded.

Tanzania
a. Household survey: Nil

b. Public meetings: Nil. b.Public meetings: 426
Meetings; 65,379
participants.

Uganda
a. Household survey:
2,505 Targeted, 2,223
Responded.

b. Public meetings: Nil
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c. Regional Distribution:
All 26 Regions covered.

c. Regional Distribution:
Central 29.54%; Eastern,
21.57%; Northern, 24.9%
Western, 24.0%. (Urban
56.46%, Rural, 43.54%.
Gender: 56% Female, 44%
Male).

d. Memoranda:
123 from General
Public, 26 from sector
groups.
e. Focus Group
Discussions (FGDs):
80 Discussions with 29
Groups involving 2,922
participants and 500
Questionnaires

d. Memoranda:
15 from organized
groups and individuals

d. Memoranda:
18 from organized groups
and individuals

e. Focus Group
Discussions (FGDs):
Nil

e. Focus Group Discussions
(FGDs):53

f. TV/Radio Talk
Shows:
21 TV and 12 Radio
shows.

f. TV/Radio Talk Shows:
58 contributions

f. TV/Radio Talk Shows:
Several in all districts and
major towns.

g. Special programs:
School Broadcast
Program, covering students in primary,
secondary and
teachers’ training
colleges.

g. Special programs:
Nil

g. Special programs:
Tertiary institutions, public
debate and awareness walk.

h. Newspapers
Responses: Nil.

h. Newspapers
Responses: 307 Articles
and letters.

h. Newspapers Responses: Nil.

i. Internet: Nil.

i. Internet: 61
contributions.
j. Key informants: Nil.

i. Internet: Nil.

c. Regional
Distribution: 2,556
participants in
Provincial
consultations, 5,330
participants in 32
targeted Districts.

j. Key informants: Nil.

j. Key informants: 214.

Source: EAC Secretariat, Reports from the National Consultative Committees on Fast
Tracking the East African Political Federation, August 2007.
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Key Findings from the NCC Consultations
The consultations across the partner states lasted from 2006 through 2008, the
NCC findings are summarized in Table 5.3 below:
Table 5.3: Summary of Key Findings by the National Consultative Committees on
Fast Tracking East Africa Political Federation
Question

Awareness/Support

Kenya

1

Level of awareness about
EAC integration
Level of support for
integration
Level of support for Political
Federation
Level of support for fast
tracking the
Political Integration process
(all stages)
Level of support for fast
tracking the
Political Federation (2013)

Generally aware 80.2%
(above 90%)
Generally aware 57.9%
(above 90%)
85.4%
66.5%

82.1%

69.9%

74.4%

77.6%

64.9%

25.4%

56.3%

2
3
4

5

Tanzania

Uganda

74.2%
88.2%

Source: EAC Secretariat, Reports from the National Consultative Committee on Fast
Tracking the East African Political Federation, August 2007.
General Analysis of the NCC Findings
Looking at the level of awareness about EAC integration, as displayed in
Question No.1 of Table 5.3, the majority of East Africans who participated in the
consultations seemed to be relatively aware of the EAC II’s integration processes; with
percentages ranging from 80.2% for Tanzania, through Uganda’s 82.1% to Kenya’s
above 90%. On the other hand, on Question No.2 (Level of support for integration) there
was a remarkable disparity in perceptions. Where Tanzania’s support for integration
stood at 57.9%, Kenya’s was above 90% and Uganda’s was 74.2%. This may be
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indicative of how each country’s sample population perceived the benefits their countries
were gaining from the integration.
On the Question of “support for political federation” (No.3), however, there was
a significant change in the perceptions of Tanzanians compared to the level of support for
fast tracking. Support for the political federation in Tanzania increased to 66.5%, while in
Kenya support stood at 85.4% and Uganda 88.2%.
On Question No.4 (Support to Fast Tracking the Political Integration Process All stages), it is interesting to note that Kenya’s support was the lowest at 69.9%(recall
that its support for integration was above 90%), followed by Tanzania’s at 74.4%, and
Uganda displayed the highest at 77.6%. From the data, it appears that citizens in all the
three states supported, with a majority, fast-tracking the political integration process
through the various stages.
On the other hand, on Question No.5 the results seem to be the most alarming in
that Tanzania’s support for fast tracking the EAC political federation only was low at
25.4%. Moreover, Uganda’s support at 56.3% (although above 50%) was not high
enough to match the unrelenting advocacy for fast tracking the political federation that
President Yoweri Museveni had continued to herald. It is also equally notable that
Kenya’s support for fast tracking the political federation, which stood at 64.9%, was the
country’s lowest level of support in all the five questions under analysis.
The point of contention regarding East Africans’ level of support for the
federation seems to have been centered on the rationale for fast tracking. Tanzania’s low
percentage brought much backlash against Tanzania from the other partner states.
However, on deeper analysis, one may note that the other two states too displayed the
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lowest support for fast tracking the federation (Kenya at 64.9% and Uganda at 56.3%)
when compared to what they had displayed on the other four factors. Still, Tanzania’s
outright rejection of fast tracking the political federation needs to be better understood. In
that regard, Tanzania’s President Jakaya Kikwete, speaking on the outcome of the NCC
consultations in October 2011, argued:
…Unfortunately, the views expressed by the people of Tanzania have widely been
misunderstood to mean that they are against East African Federation. This is not
the case. In fact, more Tanzanians supported the Federation than any of the three
East African countries... But fewer Tanzanians supported fast tracking than their
brothers and sisters in Kenya and Uganda. They are cautious about hurried
integration.138
President Kikwete’s center of argument is that, Tanzanians do not want to fast
track the political federation, but want the EAC to continue in its step by step integration
process, going into the next stage when all the conditions have been met in the previous
stage.
However, with the responses for Tanzania in Question No.2 (Level of support for
integration) recorded at only 57.9% in comparison to Kenya’s “above 90%” and
Uganda’s 74.4%, respectively, it appears indicative that, although Tanzanians may not
indeed completely reject EAC integration, they still may not be as enthusiastic about it as
their counterparts in the rest of the partner states. Whether or not that state of perception
changes and in what direction depends, I argue, on the degree to which the population
continues to participate in shaping the finer points relating to the integration.
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From a methodological standpoint, one may wish to look at the population area
coverage, i.e. from where the respondents were drawn. Table 5.4 (below) provides a
snapshot of that data.
Table 5.4: Coverage of National Consultations by Regions and Districts
Kenya
8 Provinces
108 Districts
8 Provinces
108 Districts

Tanzania
26 Regions
137 Districts
26 Regions
137 Districts

Uganda
4 Regions
82 Districts
4 Regions
82 Districts

Administrative
Structures
General
sensitization
Coverage
32 Districts
26 Regions
53 Districts
Focus
137
Districts
Groups/Public
Meetings
8 Provinces
26 Regions
4 Regions
Sampling
69 Districts
137 Districts
17 Districts
Coverage
Source: EAC Secretariat, Reports from the National Consultative Committees on Fast
Tracking the East African Political Federation, August 2007.

Of the three partner states involved in the NCC exercise, Tanzania had the
broadest coverage. It involved all of its 26 administrative regions and administrative
districts (137 in total) of the time. This compares to Kenya’s 8 provinces and 108
districts, from which the NCC in that country only drew samples from 69 districts.
Uganda’s population sample was even much smaller. Considering the country’s 4
administrative regions (Northern, Central, Western, and Eastern) and a total of 111
districts, the NCC in Uganda had access to only 82 districts and the population sample
was drawn from only 17 districts.
Whereas Tanzania’s consultations involved 65,379 participants in 426 meetings,
with a survey conducted involving 9,519 respondents, Kenya’s involved only 5,000
households and 2,556 participants in the regional consultations to mention the largest
group of respondents. Uganda’s conduct of consultations involved an even smaller group
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of 2,223 respondents to a survey questionnaire and 214 “key informants” of undisclosed
spatial or interest values.
It therefore appears to be that, in line with President Kikwete’s argument, the
number of total respondents may have been higher in Tanzania compared to the other two
states. In that regard, the 25% of the respondents in Tanzania appearing to not be in favor
of fast tracking the political federation really seems to convey the idea that lack of
support could be broad enough across the population. I will therefore explore possible
explanations why that many Tanzanians may have been against fast tracking the
federation.
The Challenge of “Territorial Nationalism”
In an attempt to explain why the federation was not happening fast enough as
expected from a reading of the EAC II treaty, Dani Wadada Nabudere argued that
territorial nationalism139 is one of the challenges that continue to hold the partner states
back from achieving the federation. Tanzania’s case requires more analysis of the
territorial nationalistic factor. The factor includes the country’s system of land tenure,
concerns about negative effects of ethnicity in the other two states, and the Zanzibar
Question.
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Land Tenure System
Tanzania’s system of land tenure is lease based, whereby a company or individual
cannot own land in perpetuity but would have to lease it, conditional on ensuring
effective development of the land. That land tenure system is different from freehold
systems employed by the other two partner states. The latter system ensures perpetual
land ownership for individuals and/or companies, regardless of whether land is developed
or remains undeveloped. For that reason, Pastory Nguvu has argued that the majority of
Tanzanians believe that fast tracking the federation may have the negative impact of
providing a potential for land grabbing by foreigners.140
Negative Effect of Ethnicity in Kenya and Uganda
Some parts of the Tanzanian public seem to believe that negative ethnicity is
among the most portent problems facing their neighbors and has led them into civil wars.
In reality, both Kenya and Uganda have had their share of the problem. Uganda was
dogged by civil war, which involved the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in its Northern
region for more than 20 years. Kenya on the other hand faced widespread post-electoral
ethnic violence in 2007-2008. Tanzania has more than 153 ethnic groups who continue to
live together in harmony.
Mohabe Nyirabu has pointed out the paranoia expressed by some Tanzanians that
federating with countries whose populations are already used to violent ethnic politics is
akin to importing the same into Tanzania.141 An observation in The Sunday Standard
(Kenya) quoting Tanzanians in an internet-based focus group on fast tracking the
federation in 2006 may elaborate on the seriousness of that perception:
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…Most Tanzanians are afraid that their country risks being infected with ethnicity
problems that characterize politics in Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi…
people from the four enemy (sic!) countries who they deride to be … washenzi
(nincompoops) should be kept out of the Tanzanian territory at whatever cost.142
Zanzibar
The case of Zanzibar is another challenge. The Isles, which are part of the United
Republic of Tanzania, have had historical opposition to the possibility of an East African
federal state. The opposition aims to avert Zanzibar’s possibility of being subsumed into
the (Tanzania) Union Government, where the country would lose its semi-autonomous
status. It is envisioned that a similar fate would face Zanzibar under a regional
federation.143 An account in a regional newspaper, The East African, also alludes to that
concern:
Zanzibar need(s) to be accorded at least an associate membership in the
community, in order to participate in decisions that affected the Isles…This (is)
because Zanzibar was [allegedly] excluded from the talks that led to the
[establishment of the] East Africa Custom Union [in 2005] despite the common
external tariffs having serious implications for the islands’ economy.144
More extreme views have even suggested that Zanzibar’s right to opt out of the
EAC II arrangement would not be different from that of Denmark and Greenland which,
“being a region within the Danish Kingdom chose not to be part of the European
Union.”145 All those factors seem to make the case for Tanzania’s only 25% support to
fast tracking the federation rather plausible.
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Challenges to the EAC II Leadership in absence of people-centered decisions
The NCC consultations, while not intended to illustrate the involvement of people
institutionally, seem to have yielded valuable insights on the potential for the
population’s participation in determining and shaping the EAC agenda for integration.
Initially, the EAC political leadership had intended to fast track the federation so it would
have become a reality by 2010, but it has not happened. The lack of favorable public
opinion in that regard could have contributed to the non-occurrence.
Furthermore, it is notable that resistance to fast tracking the federation per se did
not denote denial of the whole integration idea, including the possibility of fast tracking
all the stages of integration but rather of just the political federation. The NCC
consultations data thus provides invaluable information, which remains useful for the
future analysis of the trajectory for EAC II integration.
The central question that remains however is what format or mechanism is best
suited to ensure that the people of East Africa have the opportunity to really drive the
pace of integration, based on the material conditions they are in. Providing proper
answers to this question may enable the EAC II to eventually not only attain peoplecenteredness, but also lead to the achievement of the political federation that has
remained elusive to-date. In the next and final chapter to this study, I conclude by
providing suggestions on how the EAC II could move towards achieving those
objectives.
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusions
This study has examined whether the principle of people-centeredness espoused
in the EAC II is being operationalized in a way that could enable the attainment of the
organization’s ultimate goal for integration, namely, a political federation.146 The study
was premised on the hypothesis that wider involvement of major stakeholders (“people
centeredness”) is necessary for the successful attainment of envisaged integration
objectives.
The study’s central argument was that, if the people of East Africa do not have a
role in the process of EAC II integration and the political leadership continues to retain a
top-down approach as was the case in the EAC I, then the EAC II is likely to collapse
eventually, not unlike its predecessor, which collapsed in 1977.147 That reality seems to
continue with the EAC II. The study expresses doubts on the eventual end state of the
Community, as long as it remains inadequately people-centered.
Liberal Intergovernmentalism as the Study’s Theoretical Underpinning
To provide theoretical focus, the study sought to utilize a liberal intergovernmentalist theoretical framework. The main focus of the framework is that
integrating states can only bring to the negotiation table the preferences of their national
principal stakeholders for the integration to succeed. With the partner states’ negotiations
ideally based on their principal stakeholders (national) preferences, outcomes obtaining
from that engagement will have the stakeholders’ support.
146
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In order to achieve its analytical objective, the study examined the functioning
and decision-making orientation of the main organs of the EAC II for indications that
they have incorporated, within their processes, the primacy of people-centeredness.
Having found only limited institutional incorporation of people-centeredness (via civil
society reports to various organs including the Court of Justice) further examination was
undertaken of initiatives undertaken outside the usual EAC II institutional decisionmaking processes, which would evidence inclusion of people-centeredness.
The establishment of the Wako Committee was used as an example of initiatives
made outside the usual EAC II institutional channels. The Summit requested the
Secretariat to undertake region-wide consultations about fast tracking EAC integration.
The Wako Report led to the establishment of National Consultation Committees (NCCs)
which sought popular view points on fast tracking the integration process. It may be fair
to conclude that the NCC consultations exercise may have managed to stall the prospects
for fast tracking for some time in as much as support for fast tracking toward a federation
was relatively low. There is however still room in the future for the fast tracking to occur,
provided the partner states endeavor to develop programs that would convince their
citizens of the benefits of deepening EAC II integration.
In order to determine the extent of popular involvement in the organization, as
advocated under Article 7 of the EAC II Treaty, I first examined the rationale for the
inclusion of the concept in the current organization since it was not part of the integration
process during the era of the EAC I. Although the adoption of the concept of peoplecenteredness aimed to address the top-down decision-making character of the EAC I,
which contributed to its collapse, it appears that the insertion of the concept in the EAC II
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charter has not resulted in a fundamental shift from the top-down decision making of the
EAC I. More efforts therefore are required to make the incorporation of peoplecenteredness into the EAC II’s institutional decision-making processes a reality.

The study also took note of consultations on fast tracking the EAC II political
federation, which were conducted throughout the EAC II from 2006 to 2008. The
exercise helped to build a body of evidence both on how the people’s views can be
aggregated outside the EAC II’s institutional mechanisms and how people-centeredness
as a concept requires demystifying. While contributing to stalling the impetus of fast
tracking the political federation, the exercise also helped to shed light on the need to
further institutionalize mechanisms for involvement of the population into the regional
integration processes, in effect ensuring that the processes are really people-centered.
The Role of People-centeredness
The stronger a particular national population’s interest is in deepening integration
the more impetus a relevant government will have to push its national interests at the
regional level, simply because the government enjoys the popular legitimacy to do so.
Having attained the necessary legitimacy to push ahead with a particular stage in a
regional integration arrangement, the partner states’ governments may no longer have to
worry about the fate of decisions they make at the regional level, because they will have
their electorate’s support.
On the other hand, unless each individual EAC II government sees that they had
something to lose from their principal stakeholders -the people- they will continue to act
only in line with their own whims. If the contrary were true and popular pressure really
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became a determinant of integration, it would reduce the likelihood that political leaders
would maintain the current top-down approach to integration. In other words, where a
robust public perception for or against integration exists among a country’s population,
the potential to make political leaders losers vis-à-vis the interests of their respective
populations becomes too high to risk not being re-elected by going counter to the
perceived popular will.
On the other hand, as a concept, people-centeredness requires demystification, as
it is also prone to abuse by unscrupulous politicians who may wish to employ statistics
showing popular views to justify top-down decision-making on regional integration. For
example, it is difficult to compare the level of support for fast tracking in the three
countries studied because each country approached the consultations differently.
Tanzanian views were presented in terms of numbers of meetings conducted (426) and
number of participants (65,379), number of questionnaires which were administered
(9,519) and the specificity of gender distribution in the same and the like. In Uganda’s
case, however, the results were broken-down by rural/urban origins, gender, regional
origin and economic status. While both methods are valid, comparison are difficult.
Consequently, to provide a clear view of popular support, changes in
methodology are desirable. Otherwise, an outcome can be heralded as having come out of
a people-centered collection process, when in fact it may not necessarily be
representative of the population.
Finally one may ask whether it is more important to reach out to the people than
to develop programs for their economic development. Certainly both are necessary.
However as many a scholar’s arguments have demonstrated in this study, the utility of
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people-centeredness as a concept cannot be disregarded. Sengondo Mvungi attests to the
usefulness of the concept when he argues that, the collapse of the EAC I in 1977 came as
no surprise to the majority of the people of East Africa because they had had no say in
what was taking place in the EAC I.148 Thus, the “collapse, though regrettable, drew very
little sympathy from East Africans.”149 Similarly, ensuring popular legitimacy for EAC
II regional integration is important. Given the potential of regional integration to change
the livelihoods of whole populations across the partner states, it requires the broadest
support from the population, in order to justify its implementation.
Parliament’s Legitimatizing Role on Regional Integration
In terms of EAC II institutions, East Africa’s national parliaments represent the
broader sections of their societies from a democratic standpoint. However, there is so far
no evidence that they have been adequately involved in debating progress in the various
stages of integration. This is a missed opportunity because, if the EAC governments and
leaders were to decide to bring about their visions concerning proposed integration
trajectories, parliaments could serve as an initial point of entry for integration proposals
to be debated and eventually reach the general public for debate and decision. If the EAC
governments and leaders were to lobby their national parliaments more in advocating for
deeper integration, including fast tracking the federation, they would perhaps be able to
demystify some of the negative perceptions coming out of the debate on the rationale for
fast tracking. Instead, the governments do not seem to have seized opportunities to
address some of the criticisms generally leveled against the fast tracking idea, such as
President Museveni’s alleged personal ambition to become the first East African
148
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president. Such negative perceptions have not really been tackled; they have only
continued to be discussed in passing, without the portrayal of an actual “reality.”
In the Tanzania parliament, for example, some Members of Parliament (MPs)
opposed fast tracking the federation based on news media reports that President
Museveni had said his “desire was to see the East African Federation before his
retirement.” It was a negative allegation to which the government did not have an
opportunity to respond properly in order to counter the scare mongering already
circulating through the mass media.
Apart from institutional changes, a possible avenue for enshrining peoplecenteredness in EAC II integration which is yet to be employed is that of holding national
referenda to let the public decide whether a particular facet or stage of integration is in
their interest. This would prevent the political leadership from moving on blindly while
assuming that they have the support of their peoples when in reality they do not.
Adopting referenda on such potentially far reaching integration decisions can lend
legitimacy to the Summit’s proposals.
People-centeredness crucial element for reality check on integration
This study has consistently argued that, when properly utilized, peoplecenteredness has the potential to not only ensure continued popular support to the
regional integration project, but also to contribute to the conditions necessary for the
integration arrangement to remain sustainable. It is not the only condition but it is a
necessary one because politics alone will not ensure the success of integration. This does
not mean that political leadership must be proactive. However, political leadership needs
to be there to only ensure direction and to foster support to the integration process. On the
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other hand, the absence of a people-centered element is likely to make the integration
moribund in the longer term.
Thus, although people-centeredness has not been adequately incorporated into the
integration process; there is still room for re-organization and expansion of the
mechanisms for popular involvement in the integration processes. The EAC II needs to
re-align itself accordingly, to make the long term investments already put into the
integration process a reality for the current and future generations of East Africans.
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